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SMTP 5.7.x Bounce Codes Decoded: 5.7.1 and the Policy Family

SMTP 5.7.x Bounce Codes Decoded: 5.7.1 and the Policy Family

A message leaves your queue, gets accepted at the TCP level, negotiates TLS, sends its recipients, and then dies at the end of DATA with something like this:

550 5.7.26 This email has been blocked because the sender is unauthenticated. Gmail requires all senders to authenticate with either SPF or DKIM.

Or this:

550 5.7.509 Access denied, sending domain [yourdomain.com] does not pass DMARC verification and has a DMARC policy of reject.

The 5.7.x family is the hardest bounce class to diagnose, because it means the receiver understood you perfectly and refused you anyway. There is no typo to fix, no mailbox that doesn’t exist, no full quota. The recipient server parsed your envelope, evaluated it against a policy, and said no.

This page is a reference for that family specifically — every registered code, what the major providers add on top, and how to work out which one you’re actually looking at.

How to read an SMTP status code

A modern rejection line has three parts, and most senders read the wrong one.

550 5.7.26 This email has been blocked because the sender is unauthenticated.

1. The reply code (550).

The original three-digit SMTP code from RFC 5321. It tells you almost nothing beyond permanent (5xx) versus temporary (4xx). Nearly every policy rejection is a 550, sometimes 554, 552, or 530.

2. The enhanced status code (5.7.26).

Defined by RFC 3463 as class.subject.detail. The class is 2 (success), 4 (persistent transient failure) or 5 (permanent failure). The subject is the category. The detail narrows it down.

RFC 3463 defines class 5 as a failure “not likely to be resolved by resending the message in the current form. Some change to the message or the destination must be made for successful delivery.” Class 4 is one where “persistence of some temporary condition has caused abandonment or delay… sending in the future may be successful.”

Subject class 7 is the one that matters here. The IANA registry describes it as Security or Policy Status:

“The security or policy status codes report failures involving policies such as per-recipient or per-host filtering and cryptographic operations. Security and policy status issues are assumed to be under the control of either or both the sender and recipient.”

That last clause is the useful part. A 5.7.x is not a machine failure. Someone — the receiving admin, the filtering vendor, or you, via your own DMARC policy — configured a rule, and your message met it.

3. The free text.

This is the part you should read first. The enhanced status code space is small and heavily overloaded; the free text is where the receiver tells you what actually happened, which IP was involved, and where to go. Two servers returning 550 5.7.1 can mean completely unrelated things. Two servers returning “Client host [x.x.x.x] blocked using Blocklist 1” mean exactly one thing.

One structural warning before the table. The IANA registry registers codes in the class-agnostic form X.7.n, where X stands for the class digit 2, 4 or 5. That does not mean you may pick freely: each registry entry carries an “Associated basic status code” column that constrains which classes are valid for that code, and most X.7.x entries admit only 5xx. Providers are free to use the numeric detail space above 30 however they like, and they do. Gmail and Microsoft have both minted codes that collide with registered meanings. Those collisions are flagged below, because writing a filter rule against the number alone will burn you.

The 5.7.x family decoded

Codes 5.7.0 through 5.7.30 are the IANA-registered range, sourced from the SMTP Enhanced Status Codes Registry. Anything numbered above that is vendor-specific. Google’s emitted strings are quoted from Google’s Gmail SMTP errors and codes reference.

Code Registered / documented meaning Likely cause Fix
IANA-registered range (5.7.0 – 5.7.30)
5.7.0 Other/undefined security status (RFC 3463). Used when the condition can’t be expressed by another detail code, or can’t be described for security reasons. Catch-all. Many gateway blocks land here — but not all (Proofpoint’s own is 550 5.7.1), so check the free text. Gmail also uses it for content (552 5.7.0) and STARTTLS/auth (530 5.7.0). Read the free text — it’s the only signal. Identify the filtering vendor from the MX hostname and follow their process.
5.7.1 Delivery not authorized, message refused (RFC 3463). Result of per-host or per-recipient filtering. The most overloaded code in email: IP blocklisting, relay denial, unauthenticated submission, distribution-list rules, transport rules, reputation refusal. Never diagnose 5.7.1 from the number. Group bounces by the free-text string first, then treat each as its own incident.
5.7.2 Mailing list expansion prohibited (RFC 3463). Permanent only. You sent to a list address you’re not an authorized poster for. Get the sending address added to the list’s allowed-senders. Recipient-side config.
5.7.3 Security conversion required but not possible (RFC 3463). A conversion between secure messaging protocols was needed and unavailable. Rare in bulk sending. Usually an S/MIME or gateway encryption mismatch.
5.7.4 Security features not supported (RFC 3463). Reply code 504. The message required a security feature the delivery path couldn’t support. Remove the unsupported requirement, or route via a path that supports it.
5.7.5 Cryptographic failure (RFC 3463). Validation/decryption failed — key material missing or invalid. Key exchange or certificate problem. Verify certificates and key distribution with the receiving party.
5.7.6 Cryptographic algorithm not supported (RFC 3463). Algorithm mismatch between sender and receiver. Negotiate a mutually supported algorithm.
5.7.7 Message integrity failure (RFC 3463). The message was corrupted or altered. In-transit modification, often an intermediary rewriting content. Check for gateways or forwarders altering the message body.
5.7.8 Authentication credentials invalid (RFC 4954). Response to AUTH. Wrong SMTP username or password on your relay. Reset the SMTP credentials. Common after a password rotation nobody told the mail server about.
5.7.9 Authentication mechanism too weak (RFC 4954). You offered a mechanism weaker than server policy allows. Retry with a stronger SASL mechanism.
5.7.10 Encryption needed (RFC 5248). External privacy layer required for the auth mechanism. Cleartext auth attempted without TLS. Enable STARTTLS before authenticating.
5.7.11 Encryption required for requested auth mechanism (RFC 4954). Historical. Same class of problem as 5.7.10. Establish TLS first.
5.7.12 A password transition is needed (RFC 4954). Usually seen as 4.7.12 (reply 422/432). Account requires a one-time auth via a different mechanism. Authenticate once with PLAIN over TLS, then retry.
5.7.13 User account disabled (RFC 5248). Microsoft also documents 5.7.13 (or 135) for a public folder rejecting external senders. Sending account suspended, or a recipient public folder set to reject outside mail. Your account: contact your provider (likely suspended). Public folder: only the recipient’s admin can change it.
5.7.14 Trust relationship required (RFC 5248). Missing federation or connector trust. Configure the trust relationship on the submission server.
5.7.15 Priority level is too low (RFC 6710). Registry permits 4xx and 5xx. Receiver accepting only higher-priority messages, often under load. Often temporary — retry later, or raise MT-PRIORITY if you legitimately can.
5.7.16 Message too big for the specified priority (RFC 6710). Size limit applied at your priority tier. Reduce message size or send at higher priority.
5.7.17 Mailbox owner has changed (RFC 7293). 5xx only. RRVS check: the mailbox hasn’t been continuously owned since your stated date. Classic reassigned-corporate-address case. Suppress the address. Strong signal the contact left the organization.
5.7.18 Domain owner has changed (RFC 7293). 5xx only. The recipient domain itself changed hands. Suppress the whole domain and re-verify.
5.7.19 RRVS test cannot be completed (RFC 7293). The required timestamp wasn’t recorded. Receiver can’t evaluate your RRVS assertion. Reissue without RRVS protection if the risk is acceptable.
5.7.20 No passing DKIM signature found (RFC 7372). The message carried no valid DKIM signature and the receiver requires one. Publish the DKIM public key and confirm your signer is actually signing outbound mail.
5.7.21 No acceptable DKIM signature found (RFC 7372). DKIM passed but no signature met the receiver’s policy (key length, algorithm, signing domain). Move off sha1, use a 2048-bit key, and sign with a domain the receiver accepts.
5.7.22 No valid author-matched DKIM signature found (RFC 7372). Special case of 5.7.21. DKIM passes but the d= domain doesn’t match the From address — a DKIM alignment failure. Sign with a domain that aligns with the From: header — what DMARC alignment requires.
5.7.23 SPF validation failed (RFC 7372). Used in place of 5.7.1 per RFC 7208 §8.4. Microsoft: an issue affects your SPF config. Your sending IP isn’t authorized by the SPF record of the MAIL FROM (return-path) domain — not necessarily the From domain. Add the platform’s include: to the return-path domain’s SPF. Stay under the 10-lookup limit; exceeding it is permerror, which many treat as fail.
5.7.24 SPF validation error (RFC 7372). The only 5.7.20–26 code whose registry entry also lists a 4xx. SPF evaluation errored (syntax, permerror, DNS failure). Gmail also returns 550 5.7.24 for “suspicious entries” in an SPF record. Validate SPF syntax. Look for multiple SPF TXT records (instant permerror) and stray +all.
5.7.25 Reverse DNS validation failed (RFC 7372). Gmail: no PTR, or forward DNS doesn’t reference the sending IP. Enforced hardest on IPv6. Missing PTR, or PTR that doesn’t resolve forward to the same IP. Set a PTR, confirm forward-confirmed reverse DNS. If you can’t get a PTR on IPv6, send over IPv4.
5.7.26 Multiple authentication checks failed (RFC 7372). Gmail uses it for its baseline auth requirement. Not a Microsoft code. Gmail returns 3 strings: sender unauthenticated (needs SPF or DKIM); MAIL FROM has -all and failed SPF; or unauthenticated mail rejected by the domain’s DMARC policy. Read which string you got. DMARC string means your own policy rejected it — fix alignment, don’t weaken the policy.
5.7.27 Gmail collision IANA: sender address has null MX (RFC 7505). Gmail overloads it: “blocked because it didn’t pass SPF authentication.” (Google’s rationale is doc prose, not the response — don’t match on it.) Either your return-path domain publishes MX 0 . , or you’re a Gmail bulk sender failing SPF. Check the free text. Null MX: use a return-path that can receive mail. Gmail variant: fix SPF on the return-path domain.
5.7.28 Mail flood detected (registered from an expired Internet-Draft, not an RFC). Gmail: “unusual rate of unsolicited email from your IP.” Rate and reputation. Too much, too fast, from an IP the receiver doesn’t trust. Throttle immediately. Cut volume, mail only engaged recipients, rebuild over days. Retrying at full rate hardens the block.
5.7.29 Gmail collision IANA: ARC validation failure (RFC 8617). Gmail overloads it: “blocked because it wasn’t sent over a TLS connection.” Either a broken ARC chain (a forwarder/list server), or opportunistic TLS not used at all. TLS variant: enable STARTTLS on outbound. Genuine ARC failure: the problem is at the forwarding hop, not yours.
5.7.30 Gmail collision IANA: REQUIRETLS support required (RFC 8689). Gmail overloads it: “blocked because it didn’t pass DKIM authentication.” Almost always the Gmail DKIM variant in practice. Publish a DKIM record and verify the signature validates on a live message, not just a test send.
Vendor-specific (above 5.7.30 — no cross-provider meaning)
5.7.32 Gmail Gmail: From header isn’t aligned with the authenticated SPF or DKIM organizational domain. (Google’s docs show a 421 prefix — treat the alignment meaning as authoritative, not the class.) DMARC alignment failure specifically, distinct from authentication failure. Align the return-path (SPF) or DKIM d= domain with your From domain. A subdomain of the same org domain satisfies relaxed alignment.
5.7.40 Gmail Gmail: the sending domain has no DMARC record, or the record specifies no policy. (Also used as 504 5.7.40 for “unrecognized authentication type.”) No DMARC record, or malformed with no p= tag. Publish _dmarc.yourdomain.com with at least v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:… , then tighten once reports are clean.
5.7.57 Microsoft Microsoft: client wasn’t authenticated to send anonymous mail during MAIL FROM. An app/device relaying through smtp.office365.com without authenticating. Fix the app’s SMTP auth config, or use a connector instead of client submission.
5.7.64 Microsoft Microsoft: TenantAttribution; Relay Access Denied. A hybrid inbound connector no longer matches the on-premises environment. Re-check the inbound connector’s certificate or IP config against what your on-prem servers present.
5.7.509 Microsoft Microsoft: sending domain doesn’t pass DMARC and has a policy of reject. Evaluated against the 5322.From address. Your own DMARC p=reject enforced against you, because neither SPF nor DKIM aligned. Fix alignment. Most often catches a third-party tool nobody remembered was sending as your domain.
5.7.511 Microsoft Microsoft: “Access denied, banned sender.” Not self-service delistable. Serious reputation event on the sending IP. Email the full NDR (code + IP) to [email protected]; Microsoft responds within 48h. The self-service portal won’t work for this code.
5.7.515 Microsoft Microsoft consumer (Outlook.com): sending domain doesn’t meet the required authentication level. Applies at 5,000+ messages to consumer services from one From domain. Microsoft’s bulk sender requirement: SPF and DKIM passing plus a valid aligned DMARC policy. Full SPF, DKIM, and DMARC alignment — not one of the three. Enforced (reject from day one) since 29 April 2025.
5.7.606–649 Microsoft Microsoft (collective range): “Access denied, banned sending IP.” The specific number carries no distinct published meaning. Your sending IP is on Microsoft’s blocked senders list. Fix the behavior first, then use the delist portal at sender.office.com (one email + one IP per submission). Results “up to 24 hours or longer.”

Two things worth pinning to memory. First, the IANA registry ends at X.7.30 — every code numbered above that is a vendor invention with no cross-provider meaning. Second, Gmail’s 5.7.27, 5.7.29 and 5.7.30 mean something completely different from the registered definitions of those numbers. Any bounce-classification logic that matches on the enhanced status code without also checking the receiving domain will misroute those three.

Worth adding as a footnote to the same point: the overloading is not only across vendors, it happens within a single vendor. Google itself uses 5.7.40 both for the missing-DMARC-record string in the table above and, as 504 5.7.40, for “Unrecognized authentication type”. Google likewise attaches more than one meaning to 5.7.26, which is why the table lists three distinct strings for it. Matching on the number alone fails even when you already know the receiving domain is Gmail.

4.7.x: the same family, temporary

Swap the leading 5 for a 4 and you get the same policy category as a persistent transient failure — the receiver is deferring, not refusing. RFC 3463’s own wording is the point: “sending in the future may be successful.”

These are the most actionable bounces you will ever get, because they arrive before a block:

  • 421 4.7.0 — Gmail returns this when the sending IP has no PTR record or the forward DNS does not point back to the IP. A warning shot for the same condition that becomes 550 5.7.25.
  • 451 4.7.23 — SPF failure being deferred rather than rejected.
  • 451 4.7.24 — SPF evaluation error. Among the RFC 7372 authentication codes (5.7.20–5.7.26), 5.7.24 is the only one whose registry entry lists a 4xx alongside 550 — the other six list 550 alone. Other X.7.x codes outside that block, such as X.7.0, X.7.1 and X.7.15, also admit both classes.
  • 421 4.7.26 — Gmail: “This email has been rate limited because it is unauthenticated.” Set up SPF or DKIM and this disappears before it becomes a rejection.
  • 451 4.7.26 — DMARC-specific: “Unauthenticated email from [domain] is not accepted due to domain’s DMARC policy, but temporary DNS failures prevent authentication.” The policy decision is DMARC; the reason it is deferred rather than rejected is that authentication could not be evaluated — often your own DNS provider, not the receiver.

A rising 4.7.x rate to one destination is the single most reliable early warning in deliverability. It almost always precedes the equivalent 5.7.x. If you monitor one thing, monitor this.

The five most common 5.7.x causes in practice

1. Authentication failure

SPF, DKIM, DMARC, or alignment between them. Produces 5.7.23, 5.7.25, 5.7.26, 5.7.32, 5.7.40, 5.7.509 and 5.7.515. The most common single root cause is a return-path domain whose SPF record does not include the sending platform, combined with DKIM signed by the platform’s domain rather than yours — so both mechanisms technically pass but neither aligns, and DMARC rejects.

2. IP reputation

5.7.28, 5.7.508, 5.7.511, 5.7.606–649, and a large share of unlabeled 5.7.1s. The receiver has decided your IP behaves badly. Reputation systems react to volume anomalies, complaint rates, and traps — and they react faster than they recover.

3. Blocklist listing

Distinguishable from general reputation by the free text naming a list: “blocked using Blocklist 1”, “blocked using Proofpoint”, a Spamhaus URL, or a customer block list reference. Usually 5.7.1 or 5.7.0. The named list tells you exactly which delisting process applies, which is why the free text matters more than the number.

4. Content and message-format policy

5.7.0 with a security-issue string, 5.7.512, and Gmail’s substantial family of RFC 5322 compliance rejections under 5.7.1 — missing Message-ID, duplicate headers, multiple From addresses, malformed headers, encoded-word syntax where it is not permitted. These are cheap to fix and frequently overlooked because senders assume 5.7.1 always means reputation.

5. Recipient-side rules

5.7.2, 5.7.13 (public folder variant), 5.7.513, and the distribution-list and transport-rule variants of 5.7.1. Nothing is wrong with your infrastructure. One organization configured a rule. No amount of authentication or reputation work will change it — only the recipient’s admin can.

How to diagnose from your bounce logs

Do not read individual bounces. Aggregate them, and the pattern names the cause.

Group by recipient domain first. When 5.7.x bounces cluster in one domain, it’s a recipient-side rule or that organization’s block list — cause 5. Bounces spread across every Microsoft-hosted domain but nowhere else point to Microsoft reputation. And if they appear at Gmail, Microsoft, Yahoo and elsewhere simultaneously, the problem is yours: authentication or IP reputation.

Then group by the free text string, not the code. A thousand 5.7.1 bounces will resolve into three or four distinct strings, each a separate incident with a separate fix. Treating them as one problem is the most common diagnostic error in this family.

Then group by sending IP. If only one IP in your pool is affected, you have an IP reputation problem. If all of them are, you have a domain or content problem.

Sudden onset versus gradual. A 5.7.x rate that goes from near zero to significant within a single send points at a configuration change — a rotated DKIM key, an edited SPF record, a DMARC policy tightened from p=none to p=reject, a new sending IP, a new third-party tool. Check what changed in DNS in the last 72 hours before anything else. A rate that climbs over days or weeks, usually preceded by rising 4.7.x deferrals, is reputation decay: list quality, complaint rate, or volume growth.

Check whether the code is temporary. Separate 4.7.x from 5.7.x in the same report. The 4.7.x line is where you still have time.

Fixing each cause: the order that works

Order matters more than technique here. Most senders start at step 4, and it backfires.

  1. Stop the failing traffic to the affected destination. Retrying through a policy block is itself a negative signal, and many reputation listings expire on their own once the triggering traffic stops. Retrying resets that clock.
  2. Fix authentication. This is first among the real fixes because it is deterministic, fast, and verifiable. Confirm SPF passes for the return-path domain, DKIM validates on a live message, and at least one of them aligns with your From domain. Check the SPF 10-lookup limit. Check for a duplicate SPF TXT record. Authentication problems are the only 5.7.x cause you can fully verify from your side before sending again.
  3. Fix list and content behavior. Suppress non-engaged contacts, remove any purchased data, verify addresses that have not engaged in months, and clean up header and format problems. This is the step that determines whether a delisting request works.
  4. Request delisting — last, and only after steps 1–3. Every major provider evaluates whether your behavior changed. A request submitted while the bad traffic is still flowing gets ignored, and repeated ignored requests damage your credibility for future ones. For a 5.7.606–649 use sender.office.com. For 5.7.511, that portal will not work — email [email protected] with the full NDR.
  5. Re-warm. After delisting, return at a fraction of previous volume to your most engaged recipients only, and increase gradually while 4.7.x rates stay flat. Returning to full volume immediately reproduces the original signal.

Prevention

  • Meet the bulk sender requirements before you need to. Google requires SPF and DKIM, DMARC on the sending domain, valid forward and reverse DNS, TLS, From alignment with SPF or DKIM, and one-click unsubscribe for marketing mail at 5,000+ messages a day to Gmail; we cover Gmail’s bulk sender requirements in full. Microsoft applies its own version at 5,000+ messages to consumer services, enforced via 5.7.515.
  • Watch the complaint rate. Google publishes two figures at two different tiers, and conflating them is a common error. The 0.30% figure is the hard requirement in Google’s bulk sender list — “avoid ever reaching a spam rate of 0.30% or higher.” The 0.10% figure is best-practice guidance for the spam rate reported in Postmaster Tools, not an enforcement threshold. Treat 0.30% as the line you must not cross and 0.10% as the target you should operate below.
  • Alert on 4.7.x, not just 5.7.x. Set a threshold on deferral rate per destination domain. This is your only reliable pre-block warning.
  • Monitor authentication continuously. Enable DMARC aggregate reporting with a rua= address and actually read it. It will show you unauthenticated sources sending as your domain long before a receiver rejects them.
  • Set PTR records on every sending IP, and confirm forward-confirmed reverse DNS resolves back. Non-negotiable on IPv6.
  • Use the postmaster tools you have. Google’s Postmaster Tools at postmaster.google.com and Microsoft SNDS at aka.ms/snds. Note that SNDS has moved — the older sendersupport.olc.protection.outlook.com/snds/ URLs are being deprecated, so use the aka.ms short link.
  • Change one thing at a time in DNS. Most sudden-onset 5.7.x incidents trace to a DNS edit made days earlier by someone who did not connect the two.

Shared IP vs dedicated IP: who fixes what

The split falls cleanly along the causes above.

Authentication codes are always yours — 5.7.23, 5.7.25, 5.7.26, 5.7.32, 5.7.40, 5.7.509, 5.7.515. They are evaluated against your domain and your DNS. No IP arrangement changes that, and no provider can fix them on your behalf. On shared infrastructure your platform may host the DKIM key, but the DNS records live on your domain.

IP reputation codes depend on the arrangement — 5.7.28, 5.7.508, 5.7.511, 5.7.606–649. On a shared pool, the platform owns the IP reputation and the delisting relationship; your obligation is list quality, because one sender’s bad list degrades the pool for everyone. On a dedicated IP, the reputation is entirely yours: you benefit fully from clean sending and absorb the whole cost of a mistake. The delisting request is still usually submitted by whoever controls the IP, but the behavioral fix is yours either way.

Recipient-side rules are neither. 5.7.2, 5.7.513 and the transport-rule 5.7.1s can only be resolved by the receiving organization.

How Mailercloud handles bounce diagnostics

At Mailercloud we deliver over a billion emails a month, so we see the whole 5.7.x range daily. Bounces are classified by provider and by the free text string rather than the code alone, which keeps overloaded codes like Gmail’s 5.7.27 and 5.7.30 from being misfiled. Deferral rates are tracked per destination domain so 4.7.x patterns surface before they become blocks, authentication is validated at setup, and our deliverability team handles delisting and re-warming on shared pools.

If you are looking at a 5.7.x bounce right now and cannot work out which cause it is, talk to our deliverability team — or start free with Mailercloud.

FAQ: SMTP 5.7.x errors

What does a 5.7.1 SMTP error actually mean?

Formally, “delivery not authorized, message refused” — the receiver applied a per-host or per-recipient filter and declined. In practice 5.7.1 is the most overloaded code in email, covering IP blocklisting, relay denial, unauthenticated submission, distribution-list restrictions, transport rules and RFC 5322 format problems. The number alone is not diagnostic; the free text after it is.

Is a 5.7.x bounce permanent?

The 5 means permanent for that message as sent — resending it unchanged will fail again. It does not mean permanent for the address. Once you fix the underlying policy problem, most 5.7.x conditions clear. The exception is 5.7.17 and 5.7.18, where the mailbox or domain has changed owner; suppress those addresses.

Why do 5.7.26 and 5.7.509 both seem to be about DMARC?

They are different checks by different providers. Gmail’s 5.7.26 covers its baseline requirement that every sender authenticate with SPF or DKIM, and one of its three variants also fires on a recipient-domain DMARC policy. Microsoft’s 5.7.509 fires specifically when the 5322.From domain fails DMARC and publishes p=reject. In both cases the fix is alignment, not a weaker policy.

Why does the same code mean different things at Gmail and elsewhere?

The IANA registry only defines codes up to X.7.30, and providers extend the space independently. Gmail assigned 5.7.27, 5.7.29 and 5.7.30 to bulk-sender SPF, TLS and DKIM requirements, while those numbers are registered for null MX, ARC validation and REQUIRETLS respectively. Always interpret a code together with the receiving domain.

Should I request delisting straight away?

No. Every major provider checks whether your behavior changed before granting a delisting. Stop the failing traffic, fix authentication, clean the list, and only then submit — one request, honestly describing what you fixed. Requests submitted while the problem is ongoing get ignored, and repeated ignored requests reduce your chances next time.

What does SMTP error 5.7.26 mean?

It means the message failed authentication — Gmail returns 5.7.26 when a sender doesn’t authenticate with SPF or DKIM (and one variant fires on the recipient domain’s DMARC policy). It’s a Gmail code, not a Microsoft one. The fix is to get SPF or DKIM passing and aligned to your From domain — not to weaken any policy.

How do I fix a 5.7.509 or 5.7.515 bounce?

Both are authentication failures against your own domain. 5.7.509 means Microsoft enforced your published DMARC p=reject because neither SPF nor DKIM aligned — fix the alignment. 5.7.515 is Microsoft’s bulk-sender rule (5,000+/day to consumer inboxes) and needs SPF, DKIM, and an aligned DMARC policy all in place. Neither is solved by retrying; fix the DNS, then resend.

Amar

Amar

Amar CP is the Co-Founder and Sales Director at Mailercloud, where he leads partnerships, alliances, and customer growth. With over a decade of experience in application development, database architecture, and scaling web systems, Amar brings a rare blend of engineering depth and go-to-market expertise to email marketing. He writes about email deliverability, marketing automation, and helping small businesses grow smarter with data-driven campaigns.

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